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Abstract 
Does more bargaining power of managers inside a firm lead to larger allocations of 
capital? To tackle this question, we use unique and proprietary panel data on planned and realized 
capital allocations inside a very large conglomerate. The firm operates worldwide, is 
headquartered in Europe and has 5 divisions and 22 business units. We measure bargaining power 
by looking at the three complementary measures of power: (i) tenure of the Division CEOs; (ii) 
whether they have the local nationality; and (iii) whether they have an engineering degree (the 
firm has a very strong and very long engineering tradition). We find that (ex ante) planned 
allocations of capital are not distorted by bargaining power. We then study how unexpected cash 
windfalls at the headquarters are distributed inside the firm. The cash windfalls result from the 
sale of equity stakes in other firms and are exogenous to the divisions and business units. We find 
that managers with more bargaining power get larger parts of the cash windfalls for their own 
units. Our results suggest that bargaining power does not matter in the formalized allocation 
process but rather when it comes to the ad hoc distribution of cash windfalls. We show that our 
power variables do not seem to proxy for ability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Do divisions or business units in large conglomerates with better investment opportunities 
receive larger capital expenditure budgets and thus invest more? Or is it possible that they receive 
higher budgets simply because they are run by more powerful and not necessarily better 
managers? This is the question we tackle in this paper empirically. Common sense suggests that 
managers who are powerful inside organizations are more successful in pursuing their personal 
goals and in receiving larger allocations of capital for their own units. This idea has also been 
formalized in models by Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) or Wulf (2008). These models assume that Division CEOs 
inside firms have a preference for larger capital allocations (for rent-seeking/empire building 
reasons) and therefore conduct activities to get more funds allocated (so-called influence 
activities). These influence activities cause costs because of the resources spent on affecting 
allocations and because of the resulting suboptimal investment decisions. In general, these 
internal capital market models predict that managers with more bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
CEO of the firm are more likely to get larger capital allocations.  
We argue that the situation in the empirical literature on internal capital markets is similar 
to the one on internal labor markets where Baker and Holmstrom (1995) argued that there are 
“too many theories, too few facts” and “we need ... additional studies of personnel records, 
supplemented by interviews and institutional facts.” Following their argumentation, Baker, Gibbs 
and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b) tested theories based on detailed internal labor market data from a 
single firm. Motivated by this approach, we study what happens in the internal capital market of a 
large international conglomerate that operates worldwide and is headquartered in Europe. More 
specifically, we look at the effects of bargaining power on the allocation of capital for investment 
(capital expenditure). We use a proprietary, very rich and detailed data set on realized and 
planned capital allocations. The data set is based on internal management accounting data and 
allows us to precisely look inside the conglomerate to test our predictions. Our data contains 
detailed information on all five divisions of the firm as well as on all 22 business units. The 
business units operate under the roof of the divisions which have no operating activities 
themselves. We have monthly realized (actual) allocation data for the period 01/2001-12/2006 
and quarterly planned allocation data for the period 01/2002-12/2006. 
We measure the bargaining power of Division CEOs (which are governing the business 
units) in three complementary ways that capture different aspects of power. First, we follow the 
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empirical corporate governance literature and look at the tenure of the Division CEOs. We follow 
papers such as Ryan and Wiggins (2004) or Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) and assume that 
the power of a Division CEO increases as his tenure lengthens. Tenure hereby tries to captures 
the influence and social networks of a specific person inside the company. We also construct a 
related tenure variable by measuring instead of the tenure inside the firm the number of months in 
the Division CEO position. Second, we measure the type of academic degree a Division CEO 
holds. More specifically, we argue that a Division CEOs with an engineering degree can be 
regarded as more powerful inside our firm for a set of reasons. Our sample firm has a very strong 
and very long engineering tradition. All past CEOs were engineers, the firm has patents on some 
of the most important engineering innovations in modern history, and an engineering background 
matters a lot for a company career according to statements by several people of the firm. Third, 
we measure whether Division CEOs have the nationality of the country where the firm originates 
from, and where the headquarters and its main operations are. We hereby try to measure power 
from a socio-cultural perspective and assume that Division CEOs that have the local nationality 
are more powerful inside the organization.  
We first study whether ex ante capital allocations are efficient in the sense that business 
units with higher expected investment opportunities receive larger capital allocations, 
independent of the bargaining power of their respective Division CEOs. Our results show that 
bargaining power does not distort ex ante allocations of capital in the institutionalized allocation 
process of the firm. This result suggests that the process of setting ex ante capital allocation plans 
is designed in a way that eliminates inefficient influence activities. This finding is consistent with 
the fact that our description of the firm’s capital allocation process shows that the conglomerate 
uses sophisticated and institutionalized procedures which closely match the textbook 
recommendations for capital allocation processes (see Anthony and Govindarajan (2003) or 
Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006))1. We also show that the ex ante planned values (e.g., for 
capital expenditures) are, on average, higher than the ex post realized ones. This phenomenon is 
called “budgetary slack” and has been documented in the management accounting literature (see, 
example, e.g., Davila and Wouters (2005) and the references cited therein). 
We then use a methodology that is similar to the one employed in Blanchard, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (1994) and study whether the within-firm distribution of eight unexpected 
and largely exogenous cash windfalls at the headquarters level is affected by power. The cash 
                                                 
1 Based on internal documents of the firm, we provide a detailed description of the allocation process in the 
paper. 
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windfalls result from the sale of equity participations in other firms and are not included in the ex 
ante allocation plans. However, once occurred, the capital from these windfalls is partially 
available for the investment of the business units and can cause a deviation between planned and 
realized capital allocations.  
We show that Division CEOs with more bargaining power get larger parts of the cash 
windfalls for investment by their own business units. This finding is consistent with a managerial 
power story. We document that the economic effects of power on the distribution of the cash 
windfalls is large. We show that the cash windfalls increase the quarterly investment rate (capital 
expenditures/total assets) of an average business unit from 0.0089 to 0.0136, which is an increase 
in investment by 53%. This change in investment is significantly larger for business units of more 
powerful Division CEOs. If power is, for example, measured by tenure in the firm, then the 
change in investment is 0.0130 larger for more powerful Division CEOs. This difference in 
investment is equivalent to 146% of the average investment rate of all business unit quarters 
without cash windfalls.  
We then measure how investment changes relative to what has initially been planned by 
the firm. We find that cash windfalls have the effect of bringing realized investment rates closer 
to the initially planned ones. The cash windfall induced change is again economically significant: 
in an average quarter without a windfall, realized investment lies 0.0057 below planned 
investment. This difference reduces to only 0.0020 in an average cash windfall quarter. We then 
show that the cash windfall induced change in investment is again significantly stronger for 
business units governed by more powerful Division CEOs. Again, the economic effects are 
relatively large.  
We document that our results hold after accounting for differences in investment 
opportunities, business unit fixed effects, intra-division correlation, and a wide set of other 
controls. Moreover, we show that our sample firms is not financially constraint according to 
measures used in the literature and that the firm did not sell the equity stakes as no other funds 
were available to finance the investment of its business units. This further mitigates that the cash 
windfalls might be endogenous (see Hovakimian and Titman (2002).  
We also show that our power variables do not seem to proxy for ability. If power captures 
ability we would expect that our power proxies and future business unit performance are 
positively linked. However, we cannot find such a relation. We also show that future capital 
allocations are not adjusted downwards after units have received large proceeds from the cash 
windfalls. This is especially not the case for more powerful Division CEOs. Overall, our evidence 
 5
suggests that power does not matter in the formalized allocation process (i.e., for planned capital 
expenditure) but rather when it comes to the ad hoc distribution of unexpected cash windfalls for 
which institutionalized and structured processes are less likely to be binding. 
Our results are most closely related to the following papers. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 
(2000) predict that whether or not a division receives or makes transfers in a conglomerate 
depends not so much on its own opportunities but rather on its size-weighted opportunities and to 
what extent they are dispersed across divisions in a firm. By assuming that dispersion is the result 
of power by division managers, they link the use of power inside the firm to inefficient 
allocations. Based on US segment data, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) find evidence that is 
consistent with this story. Gaspar and Massa (2007) analyze the role of bargaining power 
(proxied by personal connections between divisional managers and the CEO) on the allocation of 
resources within large corporate organizations. Using also segment level data, they find that the 
segments run by better connected managers receive more money. McNeil and Smythe (2009) 
merge Execucomp data with segment data and find that division managers’ lobbying power 
positively affects capital allocations. They measure power by looking at tenure, time-in-position, 
board membership, and top executive status. The advantage of the studies by Rajan, Servaes and 
Zingales (2000), Gaspar and Massa (2007) and McNeil and Smythe (2009) is that they are able to 
analyze a large cross section of firms. However, this comes at the cost of having not very detailed 
data on capital allocations, especially not planned data and data on the business unit level, and on 
the power structures inside firms (see Schoar (2002) or Maksimovic and Philips (2006)).2 
Cremers, Huang and Sautner (2008) have detailed capital allocation data from a banking group 
and a measure of power (disproportionate voting rights inside the group). They document that 
power can have a bright side by overcoming asymmetric information problems within firms 
leading to more efficient capital allocations. 3 
Beyond documenting the effects of power, we exploit our planning data to mitigate 
problems of measurement error in proxies for expected investment profitability (such as Tobin’s 
                                                 
2 Schoar (2002) argues that “it seems crucial to understand how governance structures within a firm interact with 
managerial decisions at different levels of the corporate hierarchy.” Similarly, Maksimovic and Philips (2006) 
state in their recent survey on internal capital markets that “research in firm organization is particularly tricky 
because researchers specifically have to look inside corporations to assess the efficiency of resource allocations 
between various subunits”. 
3 There is also a related literature in the area of management accounting. Covaleski and Dirsmith (1986), for 
example, describe the role of politics and power in budgeting systems using interviews with nursing managers 
from six hospitals. Abernethy and Vagnoni (2004) analyze the consequences of power on organizational 
functioning. Their data set is based on questionnaire answers which are analyzed with the help of structural 
equation modeling techniques. Our paper is furthermore related to the very few studies in finance which analyze 
internal management accounting data from one conglomerate (see, for example, Bartram (2008) or Wagner, 
Miller and Zeckhauser (2006)). 
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Q, see, e.g., Erickson and Whited (2000) and Whited (2001)). Apart from relying on measures of 
imputed Tobin’s Q, we are able to use the planned investment profitability measures which are 
actually employed by the firm. These variables are Planned Sales Growth, Planned Return on 
Assets (ROA), and Planned Economic Value Added (EVA), and the corresponding values are 
available from the time when the firm’s ex ante plans were made.4 Our present study is thus also 
related to a recent paper by Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006). They address the problem of 
measurement error in Tobin’s Q by using firm-specific earnings forecasts from securities analysts 
to construct a measure of investment opportunities which does not rely on the stock market. 
Analysts’ forecasts are used to capture the expected future returns on which the firm’s investment 
decisions are based. Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006) find that investment responds 
significantly to their measure of expected investment profitability while cash flow seems to be 
insensitive. Thus, the approach taken by Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006) and our study can 
be regarded as complementary methods which both provide ways to mitigate problems related to 
measurement error in Tobin’s Q. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe models that study 
the effect of bargaining power on the allocation of capital. Section 3 describes the sample firm 
and presents the data set that is used in our study. Moreover, we deal with the question whether 
our sample firm is representative for other large manufacturing conglomerates. Section 4 
documents the capital budgeting process in our firm and describes our power proxies. While 
Section 5 presents results on whether managerial power affects the (ex ante) planned capital 
allocations, Section 6 shows results on the effect of power for the distribution of cash windfalls. 
Section 7 discusses alternative explanations, and the last section of the paper summarizes our 
results and concludes. 
 
                                                 
4 These values could be wrong, but they are the best estimates of expected investment profitability at the time the 
plans (i.e., ex ante decisions) were made. We will show later that the correlations between planned and realized 
profitability measures range between 0.61 and 0.97. See Table 7 for details. 
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2. Models of Internal Capital Allocation and Managerial Power 
 
Starting points of the literature on the relationship between the power of division 
managers and capital allocations are influence cost models such as Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992).5 In these models, Division CEOs are considered as rent-seeking managers trying to 
influence the CEO to get larger capital allocations (e.g., by overstating their own units’ prospects 
or by exercising bargaining power and lobbying activities). The basic implication of these models 
is that the misallocations of resources in conglomerates are caused by agency problems and 
power considerations inside firms. 
In this spirit, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) develop a two-tiered agency model that shows 
how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an 
internal capital market. By pursuing rent-seeking activities, division managers can raise their 
bargaining power to extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. As the CEO is herself an 
agent of outside investors, the extra compensation paid to the division managers can take the 
form of preferential capital budgeting allocations rather than of higher cash wages. The 
implication of the work by Scharfstein and Stein (2000) is that the behavior of division managers 
and their bargaining power in negotiations with the CEO matters for the understanding of 
inefficiencies in the capital allocation process.  
Wulf (2008) also looks at inefficient resource allocations that result from influence 
activities by division managers. In her model, division managers distort their private information 
about future investments to get more capital allocated. As in Scharfstein and Stein (2000), she 
thereby also assumes that division managers derive utility from having larger capital budgets, a 
preference that has been termed “empire-building” in the agency literature.  
Compared to the progress that has been made through theoretical contributions in the field 
of internal capital markets, the empirical literature is still at a very early stage. A main reason for 
this situation is that existing studies need to use publicly available segment reporting data (e.g., 
form Compustat Segment Data) with contains information at the division level only. Given the 
coarse structure of this data (no real intra-firm information) and due to the lack of within firm 
proxies for power, it has been very difficult to test the predictions of bargaining power models 
using real data. 
 
                                                 
5 For a more comprehensive overview of theories on the bright and dark sides of internal capital markets, we 
refer to the survey articles by Stein (2003) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2007). 
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3. The Firm, the Data Sets, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1 The Organizational Structure of the Sample Firm 
Our sample firm is a major international conglomerate headquartered in Europe with 
operations around the world and more than 100,000 employees. From an organizational point of 
view, the firm operates with five product divisions. Each product division itself has no operating 
activities and consists of a number of business units which are operating under its roof. In total, 
the firm has 22 business units and the general operational structure of the firm is summarized in 
Figure 1. It shows the five divisions and illustrates that Division 2, for example, has a total of 
eight business units underneath. The divisions govern the business units across different regions 
and countries. To support and facilitate various cross-division activities, the firm has a 
headquarters which coordinates central corporate functions and processes such as outside 
financing or legal affairs. The divisions have no access to the capital market themselves. The 
headquarters also holds and manages a set of equity stakes in other corporations. The executive 
board of the firm is responsible for the day-to-day management and for all major corporate 
decisions. Each of the five divisions is run by a separate management team whose head is a 
Division CEO. The Division CEOs are generally not part of the executive board.6 Below the 
divisions, all business units are run by a management team whose CEOs are part of the 
management team of the corresponding division.  
 
3.2 The Data Sets and Summary Statistics 
We have detailed monthly data on the entire capital allocation of the firm. Our data 
includes information on all business units which are operating inside the conglomerate. The data 
set is uniquely comprehensive and comes from the internal management accounting system of the 
firm. Our data set contains confidential information on both planned and realized (actual) capital 
allocations. The data on the planned capital allocations comes from the firm’s annual capital 
allocation plan that will be described in detail in the next subsection. While realized data is 
available from January 2001 to December 2006, the planned data comes from January 2002 to 
December 2006. Appendix A-1 contains an overview of the data we can use. It also contains 
information on the managerial power and cash windfall data which will be explained below. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all five product divisions of the conglomerate. 
The numbers in each column result from the aggregation of the respective business unit numbers 
                                                 
6 For a limited time period within our sample, one Division CEO served also as a member of the executive board. 
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(as the divisions have no operating activities themselves). The table also includes the number of 
business units that operate under each of the five divisions. All values are in million EUR (except 
for sales growth and total personnel). The documented statistics are mean values for each division 
and calculated based on annual data. Tobin’s Q is an imputed number and the median Tobin’s Q 
of all other traded firms in the European Union that have the same 3-digit SIC code as the 
respective division. This data comes from Datastream/Worldscope. Definitions of all variables 
are provided in Appendix A-2. 
Table 1 shows that the five divisions are very large economic players, both in terms of 
total sales and total assets, and in terms of total number of workers employed (on average 
between 8,000 and 46,000 per year). The average level of investment per year (capital 
expenditures) varies between 77 million EUR in Division 5 and 460 million EUR in Division 3. 
 
3.3 Representativeness of the Sample Firm 
To ensure that our firm is similar to other big conglomerates, we compare a set of 
characteristics of our firm with those of other large conglomerates. First, we compare its stock 
price performance with the performance of the Euro Stoxx 50 index. We use the EuroStoxx 50 as 
our firm is headquartered in Europe and has a similar market capitalization as the average firm in 
the EuroStoxx 50. Figure 2 plots the performance relative to the index over the period 2000 to 
2006 and shows that the firm’s stock price almost exactly tracks the index, even though the 
development is more volatile than the diversified index.  
Second, we analyze key financial variables of our firm and compare them with those of all 
non-financial Euro Stoxx 50 firms. Table 2 show that our sample firm is by no means an outlier 
but seems to have a slightly lower investment rate, a lower cash flow, slightly higher sales, and 
lower leverage ratio. For our subsequent analysis, it is important to note that our firm is unlikely 
to be financially constrained. Apart from having a relatively low leverage ratio, other measures 
used in the literature also rather seem to suggest that our firm faces low financial constraints (see 
Cleary (1999), Cleary (2006), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Whited and Wu (2006)). The 
firm, for example, increased its dividend payments over the sample period. While the dividend 
was unchanged from 2001 to 2004, it was significantly increased both in 2005 and in 2006. 
Furthermore, the firm initiated a share repurchase program in 2005 and paid out about 1 billion 
EUR to its shareholders. As argued in Hovakimian and Titman (2006), these considerations are 
important as the cash windfalls which we exploit later in this paper could not be considered 
exogenous to the business units’ capital expenditures if the firm would be financially constrained.  
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Third, we compare the investment-cash flow-sensitivity of the divisions of our sample 
firm with the investment-cash flow sensitivities documented in studies using division-level data 
(e.g., Shin and Stulz (1998)).7 This analysis also allows us to construct a first measure of the 
functioning of the firm’s internal capital market. We closely follow the approach used in Shin and 
Stulz (1998) and regress investment of a division on division cash flow, proxies for division 
investment opportunities, and on the cash flow of the other divisions of the firm. Other divisions’ 
cash flow is included to evaluate whether an active internal capital market exists. In this analysis 
and in what follows, cash flow is measured as the cash flow from operations. To create a measure 
of investment opportunities that uses division data, we follow Shin and Stulz (1998) and use the 
sales growth of the division and a measure of (imputed) division Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, we also 
use division EBIT as an additional proxy for growth opportunities and profitability. Consistent 
with Shin and Stulz (1998), we normalize capital expenditure, the division’s cash flow, other 
division’s cash flow, and EBIT by the same variable, namely, the book value of the total assets of 
the firm. We use division fixed effects to account for division-specific effects as and also include 
year dummies in the regressions.  
Table 3 reports the regression estimates using monthly data from January 2001 to 
December 2006. Our estimates are consistent with those documented for conglomerates in other 
studies, and especially in the study by Shin and Stulz (1998)). More specifically, we find that 
investment (capital expenditures) by a given division depends on the cash flow of the firm’s other 
divisions, but much less than it depends on the division’s own cash flow. Consistent with Shin 
and Stulz (1998), we also find that division investment is sensitive to measures of investment 
opportunities. The results suggest that our conglomerate actively operates an internal capital 
market and reallocates cash across divisions. 
Fourth, we calculate the Berger and Ofek (1995) conglomerate discount of the sample 
firm and compare it with the discount of other conglomerates. We find that the discount of our 
firm is, on average, 15% over the sample period and hence also comparable to other large 
conglomerates.  
 Overall, the analysis in this section shows that the general characteristics of our firm are 
very comparable with those of other large conglomerates, mitigating concerns that our findings 
are not representative for other multi-segment firms.   
 
                                                 
7 We use division level data, constructed by aggregating business unit variables, to be able to compare our results 
with those in studies using division level data (e.g., Shin and Stulz (1998)).  
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4. Internal Capital Allocation Process and Managerial Power 
 
4.1 The Decision Process for the Allocation of Capital 
To understand whether and where bargaining power of managers inside the firm plays a 
role for capital allocations, we have access to information describing the capital allocation 
process employed by the firm.8 Like in most companies, the general strategy of the firm, 
developed by the executive board, serves as the ultimate foundation for all major corporate 
investment decisions. To transform this general corporate strategy into concrete capital 
allocations and investment decisions, the firm has a very standardized two-phase process in place. 
Figure 3 provides an overview of this process, how the two phases related to each other, what the 
involved parties are, and who makes what decisions and when. 
 
Phase 1: The Strategic Outlook 
The objective of the first phase (i.e., the strategic outlook) is to develop a three-year long-
term strategic plan for all business units of the firm. Therefore, the firm tries to identify future 
growth opportunities for the divisions and business units therein. The strategic outlook includes 
general targets for planned investments and required resource allocations (i.e., a “guide”) for all 
divisions and hence serves as the foundation for the internal capital allocation process. The 
process is very institutionalized and structured, and it typically starts in January and ends in April 
of a given year, with decisions being made for the three-year period starting in January of the 
subsequent year. An important aspect of the strategic outlook is to have discussions between 
division management and the executive board on long-run strategies on the divisions and their 
business units.  
As can be seen in Figure 3, the strategic outlook starts with the Business Unit CEOs 
taking the lead and identifying long-term investment opportunities for their units. All over 
February, negotiations take place between the Business Unit CEOs and the corresponding 
Division CEOs over these identified opportunities, with preliminary decisions on the implied 
business plans being made by the division management in March. Each Division CEOs then 
presents the three-year business plans of their units to the executive board and negotiates over 
revisions and adjustments. Following these negotiations, a final decision on the figures in the 
strategic outlook is being made in a meeting of the executive board in April. 
                                                 
8 We can use documents provided by the firm on (i) the institutional details of the allocation process, (ii) the time 
line of different budgeting meetings, (iii) the managers that generally participate in these meetings, and (iv) the 
approval procedures for investments. 
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 Phase 2: The Annual Capital Allocation Plan 
Right after the finalization of the strategic outlook, a concrete annual capital allocation 
plan, the second phase of the allocation process, is developed for the coming year. The objective 
of the annual capital allocation plan is a one-year investment plan containing detailed resource 
allocations for all business units. The link between the strategic outlook and the allocation plan is 
hence the breaking down of the business plan for the setting of very concrete investment targets. 
The proposed annual allocation plans are also translated into a complete set of balance sheets and 
income statements for each business unit, which are subsequently aggregated and consolidated at 
the division as well as the firm level. 
Discussions over the annual allocation plan start in June with the division management, 
based on the strategic outlook, preparing investment and allocation targets for the coming year 
and presenting them to the business units. The Business Unit and Division CEOs then jointly 
negotiate over these allocation plans and conduct revisions and adjustments. Preliminary 
decisions over the budget are then being made in August. As in the strategic outlook, the Division 
CEOs then present the capital allocation plan for their divisions to the executive board and a 
second round of in-depth joint negotiations and revisions takes place. Finally, in October or 
November, the executive board decides on the investment and allocation targets for the coming 
year. The divisions and business units then receive the approved plan and build it into their 
planned budget for the next year.  
For our empirical analysis, we have data from this annual capital allocation plan. Figure 4 
provides an overview of the budgeting process over different years and documents for which time 
period we have data. Since the annual capital allocation plan is not modified, it is generally more 
informative than the strategic outlook whose plans are overlapping and adjusted during the three 
year period.9 
The firm has no institutionalized process and formalized rules on the allocation of cash 
windfalls which occur if the headquarters sells some of its equity stakes in other firms. Moreover, 
as we will describe later, the proceeds from cash windfall we study in this paper are not included 
in the annual capital allocation plan. These issues will be important for the subsequent analysis. 
 
                                                 
9 During the year, the firm also conducts quarterly budget revisions (updates) and rolling forecasts. These 
revisions, for which we do not have data, are typically necessary if product demand conditions change. In our 
regressions, we account for potential adjustments by controlling for lagged planning period deviations of planned 
EBIT from realized EBIT. 
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Execution of Allocation and Investment Decisions 
The process behind the concrete execution of capital expenditures for specific projects is 
relatively straightforward. The firm requires approval by the executive board for any project 
which involves an investment or a divestment in (in)tangible fixed assets that exceeds a specific 
threshold (in EUR). The respective thresholds depend on the different divisions and vary between 
5 and 35 million EUR, depending on how capital intensive investments are. In order to get board 
approval, each business unit has to document that the pursued investment generates a positive 
NPV. As the discount rate for the calculation of the NPV, the firm uses a project-specific 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The inputs used for calculation of the WACC are 
provided by the headquarters (e.g., tax rates, interest rates, or country risk premia). All 
investments which are below the investment thresholds are at the discretion of the business units 
and can easily and quickly be executed (e.g., to buy or replace small machines or IT). 
To summarize, the internal capital allocation process in our conglomerate is a mixture of 
top down and bottom up procedures. The procedures used are very similar to those described in 
standard textbooks on capital allocation such as, for example, Anthony and Govindarajan (2003) 
or and Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006)). However, the firm has no institutionalized procedures 
for the allocation of capital resulting from cash windfalls.  
 
4.2 The Measurement of Managerial Power 
The theoretical models on bargaining power predict that Division CEOs who have more 
power vis-a-vis the CEO of the firm should receive larger capital allocations for their units. We 
construct three complementary power measures for all 13 Division CEOs who were employed 
during our sample period.10 First, we follow the empirical corporate governance literature and 
look at the tenure of the Division CEO. We follow papers such as Ryan and Wiggins (2004) or 
Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) and assume that the power of a Division CEO increases as his 
tenure lengthens. We hence how long the individual Division CEOs have been working for the 
firm. Using tenure as a proxy, we try to capture the influence and social networks of a specific 
person in the company. We also construct a related tenure variable which directly measures the 
number of months a Division CEO has been in its current position.  
Second, we measure the type of academic degree a division manager holds (see also Table 
4 for descriptive statistics). More specifically, we argue that a Division CEOs with an engineering 
degree can be regarded as more powerful within our firm for a set of different reasons. Our 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, we do not have data on or the names of the Business Unit CEOs. 
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sample firm has a very strong and very long engineering tradition. All past CEOs were engineers, 
the firm has patents on some of the most important engineering innovations in modern history, 
and an engineering background matters a lot for a career inside the firm according to statements 
by people of the firm.  
Third, we measure whether Division CEOs have the nationality of the country where the 
firm originates from and where the headquarters and its main operations are. We hereby try to 
measure power from a socio-cultural perspective and assume that Division CEOs who have the 
local nationality are powerful inside the organization.  
Panel A of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of our power proxies. It shows, for 
example, that the mean (median) value of our tenure at the firm variable is 17.7 (16) years, with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 39 years. The mean (median) Division CEOs is in office for 
28.6 (22) months. Panel B of Table 4 documents that our power variables are positively but far 
from perfectly correlated and hence try to capture different facets of power inside the firm. 
 
5. Planned Capital Allocation and Managerial Power and  
 
The uniqueness of our data also stems from the availability of information on planned 
capital allocations from the firm’s annual capital allocation plan. The availability of such data is 
important for the analysis of the efficiency of capital allocations as planned allocations reveal the 
intended (ex-ante) allocation decisions of a firm. Moreover, having access to planning data allows 
us to use the profitability measures that were actually employed by the firm to assess future 
opportunities. This allows us to mitigate problems of measurement error in proxies for investment 
opportunities such as (imputed) Tobin’s Q which rely on market data from comparable firms and 
might be correlated with investment (see Cummins, Hasset and Oliner (2006), Erickson and 
Whited (2000) or Whited (2001)).  
Using this data, we investigate in a first step whether the planned allocations are efficient 
(i.e., mainly determined by investment opportunities) and to what extent bargaining power 
matters for these allocations. Having looked at planned capital allocations, we will then 
investigate a main reason causing deviations between realized and planned allocations, namely 
capital resulting from cash windfalls, and to what extent the distribution of these windfalls is 
related to power.  
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the planned allocation data for all business units 
of the firm. For comparison, the table also includes the corresponding realized values. The 
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planned allocation data stems from the conglomerate’s annual capital allocation plan which was 
described in Section 4. All variables are calculated based on quarterly observations. The table 
shows that the (ex ante) planned values do not exactly match the (ex post) realized ones. Planned 
capital expenditure values, for example, are higher than the (ex post) realized values. This is a 
well-know phenomenon in the management accounting literature and called budgetary slack (see 
Davila and Wouters (2005)). Panel B of Table 5 documents pairwise correlations between the 
realized and planned values. It shows that planned and realized values are generally highly 
correlated, but the correlations for many variables are far from being perfect. While the 
correlation between planned and realized capital expenditures, for example, is only 0.8605, the 
correlation between planned and realized sales is 0.9741.11 
To understand the planned budget and to measure the effects of our power proxies on the 
planned allocation of capital, Table 6 presents regressions at the business unit level in which 
planned capital expenditures is regressed on our measures of managerial power, planned EBIT 
divided by lagged total assets (return on assets), planned sales growth, and the lagged deviation of 
planned and realized EBIT.12 The estimates show that planned investment is significantly related 
to measures of future growth opportunities and profitability. These results are in line with 
neoclassical investment models which suggest that corporate resources should go to the units 
with the highest growth opportunities. Interestingly, we cannot detect that our measures of 
bargaining power matter for determining the ex ante capital allocations. This result suggests that 
the sophisticated and institutionalized process of setting the ex ante capital allocation plans is 
structured in a way that minimizes the effects of influence activities and power struggles. One 
explanation for this finding might be that the capital allocation process uses procedures which 
closely match the recommendations for “optimal” processes provided in textbooks such as 
Anthony and Govindarajan (2003) or Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006).  
 
                                                 
11 Note that the latter correlation suggests that the quality of the forecast of the expected investment profitability 
is rather high, reassuring the quality of the internal measures of investment opportunities. 
12 This regression setup is consistent with management accounting research in which, for example, budget 
adjustments as a result of spending variances are analyzed (see, for example, Lee and Plummer (2007)). The 
results are similar if we use EVA/Total Assets. 
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6. The Allocation of Cash Windfalls and Managerial Power  
 
6.1 The Cash Windfalls 
The previous section showed that the ex ante capital allocation process is not distorted by 
managerial power. Moreover, we have seen that the (ex post) realized capital allocations differ 
from the ones that were planned ex ante. We now study how capital from unexpected cash 
windfalls at the headquarters level is distributed inside the firm. These cash windfalls result from 
the headquarters selling equity stakes (often minority shareholdings) in other companies whose 
activities are not related to the activities of the five product divisions and their business units. The 
cash windfalls have not been included in the planned allocation budget but are, once occurred, 
partially available for investments of the business units. Moreover, as the Division CEOs are 
neither involved in the selling decisions nor hold the equity stakes themselves, and as the firm is 
not financially constrained (i.e., did not sell the stakes to primarily finance investment of a certain 
business unit), the cash windfalls can be considered largely exogenous to the Division CEOs, 
their divisions and their business units (see Hovakimian and Titman (2002)).  
Studying the effects of power on the distribution of cash windfalls rather than on planned 
budgets is also advantageous for another reason. Instead of being the result of power, high 
planned budgets could by itself also be a manifestation and hence driver of managerial power in 
organizations. This reverse causality problem in the analysis of planned capital allocation is 
mitigated when cash windfalls are used. As cash windfalls are not part of planned capital 
expenditures but come on top of the existing budgets, they obviously cannot proxy for power (in 
contrast to historically high budgets). 
We measure cash windfalls by looking at all equity stakes that have been sold by the 
headquarters during the sample period and that generated a cash inflow of at least 500 million 
EUR. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of the cash windfalls. In total, we could identify eight 
equity sales transactions leading to an average cash windfall of 703 million EUR, ranging from 
615 to 935 million EUR. These windfalls occur in a total of 6 different quarters and the average 
cash windfall per windfall quarter is 938 million EUR.13 As is apparent in Figures 5 and 6, the 
cash windfalls are of big economic importance for the sample firms and its five divisions, and 
they are likely to impact the firm’s operations. The windfalls in 2005, for example, amount to 
                                                 
13 The cash windfalls occurred in Q4 2003 (one windfall), Q3 2004, Q4 2004 (two windfalls), Q2 2005, Q3 2005 
(two windfalls), and Q4 2005. 
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40% of the total sales of the firm, 19% of the total assets, more than 100% of the cash flows from 
operations, four times the annual investment, and 126% of the firm’s EBIT.  
Panel B of Table 7 provides a summarized description of some of the characteristics of the 
windfalls. Detailed information for each of the windfalls is provided in Appendix A-3. One can 
see that a main reason for the sale of the equity stakes was that the headquarters considered them 
non-strategic assets and tried to time the market by exploiting a high market valuation. 
Panel C provides, based on cash flow statements, information on how the company used 
the proceeds that resulted from the windfalls. The numbers are averages calculated over the years 
in which cash windfalls occurred. The table shows that almost 20% of the money from the 
windfalls was used for investment within the firm. Importantly, 30% of the money was paid out 
to the firms’ shareholders in the form of dividends and share repurchases, and another 20% was 
used to increase cash holdings. These usages further mitigate concerns that the equity stakes were 
sold primarily in order to raise capital for the financing of projects. Figure 8 plots cumulative 
abnormal returns from a simple event study around the cash windfall announcement dates. While 
the market seems to initially react positive to the windfalls, this effect seems to disappear over the 
next 20 trading days.  
  In the following, we will focus on the effects of the windfalls on capital expenditures of 
the business units in the firm. More specifically, we will study the distribution of the cash 
windfalls within the firm by looking at the changes in the differences between realized and 
planned investment (i.e., between actual and planned capital allocations). Cash windfalls that are 
used for investment but not included in the planned allocation cause a deviation of realized from 
planned investment. If managerial power matters for the allocation of cash windfalls, we should 
expect that more powerful Division CEOs receive a larger piece of these cash windfalls. 
 
6.2 Cash Windfalls and Managerial Power: Preliminary Evidence 
Before we investigate the changes in the difference between planned and realized 
investment, we look at the windfall-induced changes in the levels of the pure investment rates 
(not relative to the plan). Table 8 shows that the cash windfalls increase the quarterly investment 
rate of an average business unit from 0.0089 to 0.0136. This corresponds to an economically 
large increase in investment by about 53% and implies that a 100 million EUR cash windfall in a 
business unit-quarter increases realized investment by about 550,000 EUR (in the same quarter). 
The effects of the windfalls on investment are also illustrated in Figure 7. Using monthly data to 
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illustrate the intra-quarter effects, it plots investment rates around the cash windfall events.14 
While monthly investment is 0.0031 for the average business unit in a no cash windfall month, it 
increases by more than 60% to 0.0050 in the cash windfall months. Moreover, the figure shows 
that the windfalls not only affect investment in the months in which they occur but also in the 
next month (where the investment rate is still 0.0046). 
Table 8 also shows the effects of differences in our power proxies on the distribution of 
the cash windfalls. The table documents a simple difference-in-differences analysis and looks at 
the change in the investment rate of business units run by more and less powerful Division CEOs. 
The table shows, for example, that the windfall-induced change in investment is 0.013 larger for 
business units whose Division CEO has an above median tenure. Again, the difference of 0.013 is 
economically significant and represents about 146% of the average no cash windfall investment 
rate of 0.0089. 
To illustrate the effects of managerial power on the distribution of the cash windfalls in 
greater depth, Table 9 looks at how the difference between realized and planned investment 
changes due to the windfalls. We measure the effects of the windfalls relative to planned 
investment in order to capture the “surprise” component of the windfalls. The table presents the 
difference between realized and planned capital expenditures (divided by total assets), again for 
quarters with and without cash windfalls, and separately for Division CEOs with low and high 
power. We then calculate a shock induced change in investment which is defined as the values in 
line (2) minus the values in line (1). The table shows that in general, realized investment lies 
below planned investment. This is a well-know phenomenon in the management accounting 
literature and called budgetary slack. Moreover, one can see that cash windfalls bring realized 
investment typically closer to planned investment. In an average no cash windfall quarter, 
realized investment lies 0.0057 below planned investment, while this difference is only 0.0020 in 
the average cash windfall quarter. 
The table also shows that the effects of a cash windfall are always much larger for 
business units whose Division CEO has greater power. For our tenure at the firm variable, for 
example, the cash windfall induced change of investment is almost three times larger for more 
powerful Division CEOs (cash windfall induced change of 0.0018 versus 0.0059). The difference 
in the power effect of 0.0031 is again economically large and represents about 35% 
(=0.0031/0.0089) of the average no cash windfall investment rate of a business unit. Overall, the 
                                                 
14 The cash windfall events are hereby defined as the months in which a sold equity stake caused a cash inflow. 
Our analysis will later focus on quarterly observations as planned data is only available in this frequency. 
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results in Table 9, combined with those in Table 8, provide some first evidence that power is 
relevant for the allocation of capital that results from cash windfalls at the headquarters level. We 
analyze this link in greater detail in the following.  
 
6.3 Cash Windfalls and Managerial Power: Further Evidence Based on Regressions 
In Table 10, we examine whether the influence and bargaining power of the Division 
CEOs over the cash windfall can explain the differences between realized and planned capital 
expenditures, after accounting for a wide range of factors, namely differences in investment 
opportunities, unobserved business unit heterogeneity, intra-division correlation, and a set of 
other controls. We regress the difference between realized and planned capital expenditures on a 
the (log of the ) cash windfall variable, our power variables, an interaction term of the cash 
windfall and the power variables, sales growth, EBIT divided by lagged total assets (return on 
assets), lagged (planning period) EBIT deviation from the plan, and lagged imputed Tobin’s Q. 
Our managerial power measure varies from regression to regression and is named in the columns 
above the regressions. The difference between realized and planned capital expenditures is again 
scaled by total assets of the respective business unit. The standard errors account for 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the division level. 
Our regression estimates show that the differences between realized and planned 
investment can be explained by how unexpected windfall cash flows that occur at the 
headquarters level are distributed inside the firm. More specifically, the results provide evidence 
suggesting that division managers who have more bargaining power within the conglomerate get 
a larger fraction of the windfalls for their own business units, even after controlling for 
performance and profitability measures. However, while our results are statistically significant for 
Tenure at Firm and Local Nationality, we cannot detect significant effects for the other two 
power proxies.15  
As it is important for the results in Table 10 to properly control for investment 
opportunities, we conduct several robustness checks of the above results. More specifically, we 
include various measures for investment opportunities: the planned measures of our sample firm, 
past realized values, future realized values, and different imputed Tobin’s Q values. While the 
measures for investment opportunities are not always significant in the regressions, the 
                                                 
15 The results are not surprising given the univariate results shown in Table 9 in which the strongest effects are 
also documented for tenure at firm and local nationality. 
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coefficient of the interaction variable between power and cash windfall remains significant in 
regressions (1) and (3). 
Taken together, our results provide evidence consistent with the models of Meyer, 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), 
or Wulf (2008), which suggest that variables which are related to the bargaining power of 
managers inside a firm have to be taken into account when analyzing internal capital allocations. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that differences between realized and planned investment can be 
mainly explained by unexpected cash windfalls that occur at the headquarters level and how they 
are distributed inside the firm. One potential concern might be that our power variables in fact 
proxy for ability which is not fully captured by measures of investment profitability. We will 
discuss this concern and related issues in the next section.  
 
7. Discussion and Alternative Explanations 
 
7.1 Capital Expenditures from Cash Windfalls versus Normal Budgets 
The previous section has shown that managers with more bargaining power within the 
firm can capture significantly more money from cash windfalls for their own units’ investment. 
Moreover, we also showed that business units of more powerful managers generally spend less of 
their planned budget compared to less powerful units. A question that naturally arises from these 
two observations is why powerful managers with a general preference for more capital try to get 
as much as possible from the windfalls, while at the same time not fully spending the normal 
budget. 
One possible explanation for this behavior could lie in the different characters of the two 
capital sources. If money from the normal capital budget (planned capital allocations) is not 
spent, for example because no profitable investment opportunities arise, it is not available for 
spending by other business units of the firm. Money from the cash windfalls, on the other hand, is 
partially available for the distribution within the entire firm. If a unit does not capture and utilize 
the available funds for its own investment, it is likely to be captured and used by other units. 
Relinquishing capital from windfalls hence implies that other units will get it. Powerful managers 
therefore have an incentive to capture as much as possible from the windfalls even though they 
might not fully spend their normal budgets.  
To better understand why investment increase so much during the cash windfall quarters, 
we conducted several interviews with people inside the firm. One view that was expressed there 
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was that investment approval procedures seem to be more lax in months with large cash 
windfalls. As discussed in Section 4, for each actual investment, certain NPV criteria have to be 
fulfilled.16 One of the stated reasons why approval procedures might be more lax when large 
windfall proceeds are available was that the firm seems to try avoiding that large amounts of cash 
accumulate in their cash accounts, generate rather low returns, or might cause shareholder 
activists to target the company. If such lax approval is more likely to happen at divisions and 
business units which are run by powerful managers, this could provide an complementary 
interpretation of our findings. 
 
7.2 Power as a Measure of Ability 
One potential concern of our findings is that the power variables, in fact, capture ability. 
In such a case, we should expect to find that ability (i.e., our power measures) is reflected in the 
planned capital allocation in the sense that more able Division CEOs get larger capital budgets ex 
ante. However, as show in Section 5 where we regressed the planned capital allocations for 
investment on the power variables and controls, we have no evidence for such a relationship. This 
finding not only implies that power does not seem to matter for the institutionalized ex ante 
capital allocation process, it also suggests that our power variables are likely not to proxy for 
ability. Otherwise, we should have seen a positive relation between planned investment and the 
ability variables. 
As a further test, we also regressed future performance of the business units on our power 
proxies and a set of controls (not reported here). If our power variables capture ability, we should 
see a positive relationship between future performance and our power proxies. To measure 
performance, we use EBIT/Total Assets, Sales Growth and EVA/Total Assets. When we regress 
future performance on our power variables, we find that the relationship between the two is either 
statistically insignificant (for EBIT/Total Assets and Sales Growth) or very low and economically 
insignificant (for EVA/Total Assets). Overall, these findings affirm that our power variables are 
not proxying for ability. 
 
                                                 
16 Planned capital expenditures are usually the upper limit for actual capital expenditures. Actual investment can 
be below planned investment in the cases in which not all actual investment projects have been approved by 
upper level managers (the headquarters) even though they have been budgeted. If planned investment is not 
spent, it cannot be transferred to the next year. However, there is no year end ratcheting due to the approval 
procedure in which upper level managers have to decide on suggested investment projects. 
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7.3 Adjustment of Investment after Cash Windfalls 
We have shown that investment rises significantly in those quarters in which cash 
windfalls occurred and that this increase was much more pronounced for the business units of 
more powerful Division CEOs. In this section, we analyze whether investment is adjusted 
downwards in the quarters after the cash windfalls. We hereby aim at testing whether powerful 
Division CEOs get less capital allocated in periods after the windfalls. If this is the case, it would 
imply a mitigation or even elimination of the cash windfall effects and weaken our power results. 
We therefore separate the sample into business units of more and less powerful Division 
CEOs and regress investment on lagged investment, a lagged cash windfall dummy, an 
interaction term between the two and a set of controls. The results in Table 11 document that 
investment shows a positive autocorrelation and that there is no evidence for a downward 
adjustment in capital expenditure after increased investment in cash windfall periods. Moreover, 
we cannot detect any differences in the investment adjustment between more and less powerful 
Division CEOs. 
 
7.4 Efficiency of Investment 
To judge the overall efficiency of investment in our sample firm and to complement our 
Shin and Stulz (1998) type of analysis, we also employ the methodology suggested by Ozbas and 
Scharfstein (2008). They analyze the Tobin’s Q-sensitivity of investment for divisions of firms to 
infer investment efficiency. In unreported regressions, we find for our sample firm that 
investment is sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (such as sales growth) for less 
powerful Division CEOs whereas investment is not sensitive to these measures for more powerful 
Division CEOs. These results suggest that investment of divisions and business units which are 
run by powerful managers is less efficient than the investment of the remaining divisions and 
business units. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Using uniquely comprehensive and confidential data from the internal management 
accounting system of a large international conglomerate, we analyzed the efficiency of capital 
allocation inside the firm. We tested predictions of theories that link managerial power inside a 
firm and allocation of capital and which have been difficult to test due to data limitations. Our 
data set not only included data on both realized and planned capital allocations.  
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Using planned data, we showed that the analysis of realized instead of planned allocations 
might be misleading. When we looked at ex-ante allocation decisions, we found that only 
profitability measures were related to capital expenditures. These results are important as they 
suggest that the firm’s ex-ante capital allocations plans might be regarded as rather efficient. We 
then studied how unexpected cash windfalls that occur at the headquarters level are distributed 
inside the firm. We showed that division managers who have more bargaining power within the 
conglomerate can get a larger part of these windfall cash flows for their own business units (after 
controlling for performance and profitability measures). These results suggested that variables 
which are related to the bargaining power of managers inside a firm should be taken into account 
when analyzing internal capital allocations. Regarding generalizations of our results, we are 
aware that our evidence is based on data from one conglomerate. The advantage is that we can 
hold the institutional and organizational set-up of the firm and of the employed capital allocation 
process constant but it certainly also implies limitations.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics at the Division Level 
      
This table presents descriptive statistics of all five divisions of the sample firm for the period January 2001 to December 2006. It also includes the number of business units that operate 
within each of the five divisions. All values are in million EUR (except for sales growth and total personnel). The numbers presented here are calculated as the annual year-end averages 
over the six years. Tobin's Q is the median Q of all other firms with the same 3-digit SIC code in the European Union and this data comes from Datastream/Worldscope. For variable 
definitions, see Appendix A-2. 
      
  Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 Division 5 
      
Number of Business Units 4 8 1 5 4 
Median Tobin's Q of Firms with Same 3-digit SIC Code 2.15 1.94 1.62 1.27 1.62 
Capital Expenditure (million EUR) 80.64 102.11 456.62 166.73 77.53 
Sales (million EUR) 9,378.52 6,157.89 4,425.04 5,212.04 2,031.98 
Sales Growth (in %) 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.10 
EBIT (million EUR) -91.68 476.99 -61.09 593.04 360.43 
Total Assets (million EUR) 2,504.91 5,510.19 4,334.16 2,694.51 917.31 
Cash Flow from Operations (million EUR) 216.45 832.38 784.87 793.94 488.84 
Total Personnel 17,212 27,358 33,985 45,785 8,188 
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Table 2: Key Financial Variables of Sample Firm and Non-Financial DJ Euro Stoxx 50 Firms 
          
This table presents key financial variables of our sample conglomerate and compares them with all non-financial Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 firms. For the non-financial Dow Jones Euro 
Stoxx 50 firms, we report means, medians, standard deviations as well as several percentiles. The table shows average values from 2000 to 2006 of yearly data.  For variable definitions, 
see Appendix A-2. 
          
 Sample Firm  DJ Euro Stoxx 50 
          
   Mean Standard 10th percentile 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 90th percentile 
        deviation           
          
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 0.045  0.056 0.026 0.029 0.040 0.050 0.069 0.090 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.058  0.098 0.046 0.056 0.073 0.091 0.107 0.158 
Sales/Total Assets 0.942  0.794 0.430 0.384 0.481 0.686 0.988 1.287 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 0.470   0.644 0.121 0.468 0.576 0.643 0.729 0.803 
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Table 3: Estimates of Investment Equation at the Division Level 
   
This table presents regressions estimates at the division level of capital expenditures on cash flow from operations, cash 
flow from operations of other divisions, sales growth, imputed Tobin's Q, and EBIT divided by lagged total assets (return 
on assets). Capital expenditures and the two cash flow variables are scaled by lagged total assets. Imputed Tobin's Q is the 
median Q of all other firms in the European Union that have the same 3-digit SIC code as the respective division. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level. In the regressions, we use monthly data from January 2001 to December 2006. 
Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Appendix A-2. ** indicates 
significance at 5%, ***indicates significance at 1%. Standard errors are also adjusted for intra-division correlation. 
   
 Capital Expenditure/Total Assets 
   
  (1) (2) 
   
Own Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.022 0.019 
 (2.50)** (2.09)** 
Cash Flow (other divisions)/Total Assets 0.007 0.007 
 (2.58)** (2.50)** 
Sales Growth 0.001 0.001 
 (3.82)*** (3.69)*** 
Imputed Tobin's Q (Lagged Value) 0.000 0.000 
 (0.14) (0.04) 
EBIT/Total Assets  0.022 
  (1.29) 
Constant -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.78) (0.63) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Divison Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Clustering by Division Yes Yes 
   
Observations 296 296 
Adj. R-squared 0.20 0.21 
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Table 4: Measures of Managerial Power Inside the Firm: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
     
Panel A provides summary statistics of our measures of bargaining power inside the firm. The variables are defined in Appendix 
A-2. The variables are self-constructed based on annual reports and web searches. Panel B presents correlation coefficients (and 
the corresponding p-values) between our measures of bargaining power inside the firm. The table also contains the number of 
observations used to calculate the respective correlations.  
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics       
     
Number of Division CEOs in Sample 13  
     
Tenure Tenure at Firm Minimum 0  
 (in years) Mean 17.71  
  Median 16.00  
  Maximum 39  
  Std. dev. 14.57  
  Obs. (Business Unit Quarters) 515  
     
 Tenure as Division CEO Minimum 2  
 (in months) Mean 28.58  
  Median 22.00  
  Maximum 86  
  Std. dev. 21.56  
  Obs. (Business Unit Quarters) 515  
     
Engineering Degree Business Unit Quarters Yes 356 69% 
 Business Unit Quarters No 159 31% 
     
Local Nationality Business Unit Quarters Yes 218 42% 
  Business Unit Quarters No 297 58% 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients         
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tenure at Firm (1) 1.0000    
     
 515    
Tenure as Division CEO (2) 0.4863 1.0000   
 (0.0000)    
 515 515   
Engineering Degree (3) -0.1662 -0.0238 1.0000  
 (0.0002) (0.5899)   
 515 515 515  
Local Nationality (4) 0.8959 0.4922 -0.0655 1.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1379)  
  515 515 515 515 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Planned and Realized Variables at the Business Unit Level 
         
Panel A presents descriptive statistics of all business units of the sample firm for the period January 2002 to December 2006 (planned values) and January 2001 to December 2006 
(realized values). The numbers presented here are calculated as the averages across quarterly data. For variable definitions, see Appendix A-2. The data is from the internal management 
accounting system of the firm. Panel B presents correlation coefficients between realized values and planned values at the business unit level. The correlations are calculated using 
quarterly data from January 2002 to December 2006. *** indicates significance at 1%. The table also contains the number of observations used to calculate the respective correlations. The 
data is from the internal management accounting system of the firm. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics         
Variable Obs. Mean 
1st 
percentile 
25th  
percentile Median 
75th  
percentile 
99th  
percentile Std. dev 
Planned Sales (in million EUR) 411 352.24 20.56 107.10 221.00 405.46 1,653.39 383.83 
Planned EBIT (in million EUR) 411 25.93 -30.70 2.46 13.02 44.57 103.99 40.00 
Planned EBIT/Total Assets 411 0.04 -0.10 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.06 
Planned Sales Growth 390 0.05 -0.59 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.78 0.26 
Planned Cash Flow from Operations (in million EUR) 227 42.69 -64.42 2.55 19.51 54.32 287.70 70.95 
Planned Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets 227 0.05 -0.28 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.44 0.10 
Planned Capital Expenditure (in million EUR) 371 12.50 -0.80 3.12 4.67 9.96 132.13 25.16 
Planned Personnel 227 6,444 275 1,214 3,849 7418   35771 7954 
         
Sales (in million EUR) 515 316.96 20.17 93.09 194.84 357.53 1,632.40 371.09 
EBIT (in million EUR) 515 14.89 -254.84 -2.30 9.19 37.32 140.68 59.23 
EBIT/Total Assets 515 0.02 -0.22 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.24 0.11 
Sales Growth 493 0.04 -0.55 -0.08 0.02 0.15 0.78 0.27 
Cash Flow from Operations (in million EUR) 515 36.31 -123.17 -0.60 17.12 50.26 337.40 77.95 
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets 515 0.05 -0.42 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.43 0.13 
Capital Expenditure (in million EUR) 515 10.29 -7.82 1.52 3.29 8.09 147.46 31.40 
Capital Expenditure/Total Assets 515 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.06 
Personnel 515 6,105 295 1,203 3,407 7,418 35,771 7,954 
          
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients      Correlation  p-Value  Observations 
Correlation (Sales, Planned Sales)   0.9741  <0.0001***  411 
Correlation (EBIT, Planned EBIT)    0.6066  <0.0001***  411 
Correlation (Cash Flow from Oper., Planned Cash Flow from Oper.) 0.6154  <0.0001***  403 
Correlation (Capital Expenditure, Planned Capital Expenditure) 0.8605  <0.0001***  371 
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Table 6: Determinants of Planned Investment at the Business Unit Level 
      
This table presents fixed effects panel regression results at the business unit level of planned capital expenditures on several measures of managerial power, planned EBIT divided by 
lagged total assets (return on assets), planned sales growth, and lagged (planning period) deviation from planned and realized EBIT. Planned capital expenditures is scaled by lagged 
total assets. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level. In the regression, we use quarterly data from January 2002 to December 2006. Absolute values of robust t statistics are in 
parentheses. Standard errors are also adjusted for intra-division correlation. Variable definitions are in Appendix A-2.*** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; * 
indicates significance at 10%. 
 
 
Planned Capital Expenditure/Total Assets 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Planned EBIT/Total Assets 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 
 (1.37) (1.44) (1.41) (1.40) (1.37) 
Planned Sales Growth 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (2.47)** (2.56)** (2.51)** (2.52)** (2.48)** 
Engineering Degree     0.000 
     (0.06) 
Tenure as Division CEO    0.000  
    (1.28)  
Local Nationality   0.004   
   (1.47)   
Tenure at Firm  0.000    
  (1.48)    
Lagged EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets 0.077 0.092 0.09 0.087 0.077 
 (2.70)*** (2.92)*** (2.90)*** (2.99)*** (2.71)*** 
Constant 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 
 (11.24)*** (6.28)*** (7.60)*** (9.85)*** (6.36)*** 
      
Business Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering by Division Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
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Table 7: Description of Cash Windfalls 
   
This table presents a description of the cash windfalls. The headquarters of the firm held equity stakes in other firms that 
were sold and resulted in large cash windfalls during the period 01/2001-12/2006. Cash windfalls occurred in Q4 2003 (one 
windfall), Q3 2004, Q4 2004 (two windfalls), Q2 2005, Q3 2005 (two windfalls), and Q4 2005. Panel A reports the 
frequency of the cash windfall and provides descriptive statistics of the size of the windfalls (in million EUR). Panel B 
provides a summarized description of the windfalls. It contains the stated reasons for the sale, the stated usage of the 
proceeds from the windfalls, the procedure of how the stake was sold, and the pre- and after sale stake which the sample 
firm held. Furthermore, it also contains information on how long the sample firm held the equity stakes.  Panel A and B are 
constructed based on information from company news reports as well as newspaper articles.  Panel C contains information 
on the observed usage of the cash windfalls. These figures are calculated based on cash flow statements of the firm. A 
detailed description of the individual cash windfalls is contained in Appendix A-3.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Cash Windfalls   
Number of Cash Windfalls  8 
Number of Quarters with Cash Windfalls 6 
Size of Cash Windfalls  Mean 703 
(million EUR) Median 694 
 Min 615 
 Max 935 
 Std.dev. 140 
Profit from Cash Windfalls Mean 425 
(million EUR) Median 380 
   
Panel B: Description of Cash Windfalls   
Stated Reason for Equity Stake # Non-strategic asset 6 
(multiple usages possible) # Exploit high market value 3 
 # Reduce exposure to cyclical ind. 2 
 
Stated Usage of Money from Equity Stake* # Fund strategic growth options 6 
(multiple reasons possible) # General corporate purposes 2 
 # Reduction of debt 1 
 
Procedure of Sale of Equity Stake # Initial Public Offering (IPO) 1 
 # Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) 4 
 # OTC Transaction (OTC) 3 
 
Pre-Sale Equity Stakes Mean 32% 
 Median 29% 
 
After-Sale Equity Stake Mean 16% 
 Median 16% 
 
Holding Period of Equity Stake Mean 12 
(years) Median 11 
* This information was available only for seven cash windfalls  
   
Panel C: Usage of Cash Windfalls     
Capital Expenditure  19% 
Working Capital (increase)  1% 
Acquisitions  13% 
Repayment Debt  21% 
Dividends  9% 
Share Repurchases  11% 
Tax  6% 
Increase in Cash Holdings   20% 
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Table 8: Cash Windfalls and Power: Effects for Capital Expenditures 
     
This table presents the effects of power (measured by tenure of division CEOs in the firm, months as Division CEO, whether 
or not the Division CEO has the local nationality and whether or not he has an engineering degree). The table reports 
investment rates (capital expenditure/total assets) at the business unit level for cash windfall and no cash windfall quarters. 
The business units are separated based on the power measures for the corresponding Division CEOs. The cash windfall 
induced change is calculated as values in line (2) minus values in line (1). The average investment rate for all no cash windfall 
business unit quarters is 0.0089 and 0.0136 for all cash windfall business unit quarters. 
     
  Managerial Power Managerial Power  
  Measure Low Measure High   
     
 Full Sample Low Tenure at Firm High Tenure at Firm  
    (below median) (above median)   
     
No Cash Windfall Quarter (1) 0.0089 0.0077 0.0098 0.0021 
Cash Windfall Quarter (2) 0.0136 0.0083 0.0234 0.0151 
    Diff in diffs 
Cash Windfall Induced Change 0.0006 0.0006 0.0136 0.0130 
     
  Low Tenure as Division CEO High Tenure as Division CEO  
    (below median) (above median)   
     
No Cash Windfall Quarter (1) 0.0089 0.0058 0.012 0.006 
Cash Windfall Quarter (2) 0.0136 0.0139 0.0133 -0.001 
    Diff in diffs 
Cash Windfall Induced Change 0.0006 0.0082 0.0013 -0.0070 
     
  Division CEO Division CEO  
     not Local Nationality  Local Nationality   
     
No Cash Windfall Quarter (1) 0.0089 0.003 0.0161 0.013 
Cash Windfall Quarter (2) 0.0136 0.0083 0.0234 0.015 
    Diff in diffs 
Cash Windfall Induced Change 0.0006 0.0053 0.0074 0.0020 
     
  Division CEO  Division CEO  
    Non-Engineer Engineer   
     
No Cash Windfall Quarter (1)  0.0152 0.006 -0.009 
Cash Windfall Quarter (2)  0.0153 0.0129 -0.002 
    Diff in diffs 
Cash Windfall Induced Change 0.0006 0.0001 0.0069 0.0070 
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Table 9: Managerial Power and Cash Windfall Induced Deviations 
between Realized and Planned Investment at the Business Unit Level 
     
This table presents the difference between realized and planned capital expenditures (divided by total assets) for quarters with 
and without a cash windfall. The difference is shown separately for low and high power CEOs. The cash windfall induced 
change is calculated as values in line (2) minus values in line (1). The table reports mean values over both quarters with and 
without cash windfalls. 
     
  Managerial Power Managerial Power  
  Measure Low Measure High   
     
 Full Sample Low Tenure at Firm High Tenure at Firm  
    (below median) (above median)   
     
No Cash Windfall Quarter (1) -0.0057 -0.0036 -0.0082 -0.0046 
Cash Windfall Quarter (2) -0.002 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0005 
    Diff in diffs 
Cash Windfall Induced Change 0.0037 0.0018 0.0059 0.0041 
     
  Low Tenure as Division CEO High Tenure as Division CEO  
    (below median) (above median)   
     
No Cash Windfall Quarter (1) -0.0057 -0.0047 -0.0062 -0.0015 
Cash Windfall Quarter (2) -0.002 -0.0025 -0.0016 0.0009 
    Diff in diffs 
Cash Windfall Induced Change 0.0037 0.0022 0.0046 0.0024 
     
  Division CEO Division CEO  
     not Local Nationality  Local Nationality   
     
No Cash Windfall Quarter (1) -0.0057 -0.0038 -0.0082 -0.0044 
Cash Windfall Quarter (2) -0.002 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0005 
    Diff in diffs 
Cash Windfall Induced Change 0.0037 0.0021 0.0059 0.0039 
     
  Division CEO  Division CEO  
    Non-Engineer Engineer   
     
No Cash Windfall Quarter (1) -0.0057 -0.0084 -0.0048 0.0036 
Cash Windfall Quarter (2) -0.002 -0.0045 -0.0008 0.0037 
    Diff in diffs 
Cash Windfall Induced Change 0.0037 0.0038 0.0041 0.0001 
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Table 10: Determinants of Deviations Between Realized and Planned Investment  
at the Business Unit Level 
 
This table presents fixed effects panel regressions at the business unit level of the differences between realized and planned 
capital expenditures on the cash shock variable (cash inflow at the headquarters level from the selling of equity stakes in 
other firms as measured as ln(1+Cash Windfall)), a managerial power variable (the four different power variables are 
reported in the four different columns), an interaction term of the cash windfall and the power variable, sales growth, EBIT 
divided by lagged total assets (return on assets), lagged (planning period) EBIT deviation from the plan, and lagged 
imputed Tobin's Q. The difference between realized and planned capital expenditures is scaled by total assets of the 
respective business unit. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level. In the regression, we use quarterly data from January 
2002 to December 2006. The coefficient of the interaction term is multiplied with 10,000. Absolute values of robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are also adjusted for intra-division correlation. For variable definitions, see 
Appendix A-2. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%. 
     
 Dependent variable: (Realized Capital Exp.-Planned Capital Exp.)/Total Assets 
Managerial Power Variable: Tenure at Firm Tenure as Division CEO Local Nationality Engineering Degree 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Sales Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.23) (0.51) (0.25) (0.63) 
EBIT/Total Assets 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.027 
 (2.34)* (2.06) (2.42)* (2.06) 
Lagged EBIT Deviation from Plan/ -0.062 -0.061 -0.060 -0.062 
Total Assets (6.43)*** (5.60)*** (5.91)*** (8.64)*** 
Tobin's Q (Lagged Value) 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.010 
 (1.18) (0.56) (1.21) (1.20) 
ln(Cash Windfalls) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.55)* (1.87) (2.65)* (2.61)* 
Managerial Power -0.000112  -0.000052 -0.003 0.001 
 (2.46)* (0.69) (1.66) (0.50) 
Managerial Power * ln(Cash Windfall) 0.119 -0.052 4.114 -3.152 
 (2.76)* (0.05) (2.45)* (1.33) 
Constant -0.023 -0.018 -0.024 -0.028 
 (1.37) (0.65) (1.43) (1.44) 
     
Business Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fourth quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering by Division Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 311 311 311 311 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
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Table 11: Adjustment of Investment after Cash Windfalls 
        
This table presents fixed effects panel regressions at the business unit level of regression of capital expenditure on lagged 
capital expenditure, a lagged cash windfall dummy, an interaction term between the two and a set of controls. The sample is 
separated into business units belonging to division CEOs with high and low bargaining power (measured by tenure in the 
displayed table). Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are also adjusted for intra-division 
correlation. The sample period is January 2001-December 2006. For variable definitions, see Appendix A-2. *** indicates 
significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%. 
        
 Capital Expenditure/Total Assets 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 
  Tenure < Median Value   Tenure > Median Value   Full Sample 
        
Lagged Capital Expenditure/Total Assets 0.165 0.212  0.403 0.398  0.384 
 (2.73)*** (2.63)***  (3.88)*** (2.93)***  (3.68)*** 
Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.002 0.001  0.026 0.028  0.015 
 (0.26) (0.23)  (1.54) (1.61)  (1.71)* 
Sales Growth 0.005 0.005  0.007 0.007  0.004 
 (2.40)** (2.35)**  (1.03) (0.99)  (1.61) 
Lagged Cash Windfall Dummy  0.002   -0.006  0.000 
  (1.24)   (1.33)  (0.01) 
Lagged Cash Windfall Dummy * Lagged Capital Expenditure -0.144   0.060  -0.081 
  (1.09)   (0.33)  (0.64) 
Constant 0.006 0.006  0.011 0.011  0.008 
 (2.57)** (2.48)**  (4.05)*** (3.72)***  (3.74)*** 
        
Business Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Clustering by Division Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
        
Observations 230 230  197 197  427 
R-squared 0.09 0.10   0.21 0.21   0.16 
 
Figure 1: Operational Structure of the Firm 
 
This figure summarizes the operational structure of the firm. It shows the five divisions and illustrates that Division 2, for example, has a total of eight business units underneath. 
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Figure 2: Sample Firm and DJ Euro Stoxx 50 (Jan 2000 to Dec 2006) 
 
This figure shows the normalized performance of the sample firm relative to the DJ Euro Stoxx 50 over the period January 2000 to December 2006. 
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Figure 3: Decision Process behind Allocation of Capital 
 
This figure presents an overview of the process behind the allocation of capital. The capital allocation process consists of two phases, the Strategic Outlook and the Annual Capital 
Allocation Plan. The figure shows how these two phases related to each other, what the involved parties are, and who makes what decisions and when. 
 
Involved Party:
Involved Party:
March/April: 
Negotiations over long-
term business plans of 
Business Units
Phase 1: Strategic Outlook for Business Units
January: Start identifying 
long-term investment opport. 
and present them to Division 
CEO/CFO
Business Unit CEO
July: Negotiations over 
one-year investment 
and allocation targets of 
Business UnitsDivision CEO
Business Unit CEO
Division CEO
Executive Board 
(Headquarters)
Phase 2: Annual Capital Allocation Plan for Business Units
Executive Board 
(Headquarters)
October/November: 
Final decision on one-
year annual capital 
allocation plan for all 
Business Units
June: Based on Strategic 
Outlook, prepare one-year 
concrete investment and 
allocation targets 
Objective: Three-year long-term strategic plan ("guide")
Objective: One-year detailed capital allocation plan
April: Final decision on 
long-term business 
plans for Business Units 
(three-year strategic 
outlook)
February: Negotiations 
over long-term 
investment opport. 
Business Units March: Prelim. 
decisions on long-term 
business plans of 
Business Units
August: Prelim. 
decisions on one-year 
investment and 
allocation targets of 
Business Units
September/October: 
Negotiations over one-
year investment and 
allocation targets of 
Business Units
Planning and Negotiations
Planning and Negotiations
Our data source: 
Annual Capital Allocation Plan
 
 41
Figure 4: Capital Budgeting Process over Time and Available Data 
 
This figure presents an overview of the processes behind the allocation of capital over time and shows the data we have available. Data on realized capital allocation is available from 
2001-2006, data on planned capital allocation from 2002-2006. 
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Figure 5: Importance of Cash Windfalls Relative to Firm Level Variables 
 
This figure documents the relative importance of the cash windfalls by relating the resulting cash inflows to sales, total assets, cash flow from operations, capital expenditures, and EBIT 
of the firm. The firm variables are calculated by aggregating the corresponding division figures. Cash windfalls occurred in the year 2003 (one windfall), 2004 (three windfalls), and 
2005 (four windfalls). The figure relates the cash windfalls of the respective years to the corresponding firm level variables of the same year.  
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Figure 6: Importance of Cash Windfalls Relative to Division Level Variables 
 
This figure documents the relative importance of the cash windfalls by relating the resulting cash inflows to sales, total 
assets, and cash flow from operations of the five divisions. Cash windfalls occurred in the year 2003 (one windfall), 2004 
(three windfalls), and 2005 (four windfalls). The figure relates the cash windfalls of the respective years to the 
corresponding division level variables of the same year.  
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Panel B: Cash Windfalls 2004 
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Panel C: Cash Windfalls 2005 
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Figure 7: Monthly Investment Rates (Capital Expenditures Divided by Total Assets) around the Cash Windfall Events 
 
This figure illustrates the average monthly Business Unit investment rates (capital expenditures/total assets) after the months in which the cash windfalls took place.   
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Figure 8: Stock Price Performance Around Cash Windfalls 
 
This figure illustrates cumulative abnormal returns for the firm’s stock price around the cash windfall announcement dates.    
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A-1: Overview Over Data Sets and Data Sources 
 
This table provides an overview of the three data sets we use, provides the respective content as well as the time periods and the source. 
 
Data Type Content Time Period Source 
    
Data on Capital Allocations Realized Data: Data on realized capital allocations for all 5 
Divisions and 22 Business Units. 
Monthly from 01/2001-12/2006 Internal management accounting system of the 
firm  
    
 Plan Data: Data on the planned capital allocations for all 5 
Divisions and 22 Business Units. 
Quarterly from 01/2002-12/2006 Internal management accounting system of the 
firm 
    
 Plan data is not adjusted during the year, i.e. we have the 
initial allocation plans. There is hence no bias from 
manipulations of the plance once performance occurred 
during the year 
  
    
Data on Managerial Power 
inside the Firm 
For 13 Division CEOs data on Tenure, Local Nationality, 
and Type of University Degree  
01/2001-12/2006 Self-constructed based on annual reports and 
web searches 
    
Data on Cash Windfalls  Headquarter has equity stakes in other firms that were sold 
and resulted in 8 large cash windfalls.  
01/2001-12/2006 Self-constructed based on annual reports, press 
statements, ad hoc information, and web 
searches 
    
 Cash windfalls are exogenous (firm is not financially 
constraint)  
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Appendix A-2: Definition of Variables 
 
This table summarizes and defines the variables used in the empirical analysis. All variables are measured in EUR (except for sales growth, total personnel, and the managerial power 
variables). The financial variables listed below are available at the business unit level. The managerial power variables are available at the Division CEO level. 
 
Variable Description 
  
Financial variables   
Capital Expenditure Defined as investments of a business unit in tangible and intangible assets, adjusted for proceeds from the sales of fixed assets and/or software 
  
Sales Defined as the proceeds of a business unit from the sales of products or services to third parties and other divisions inside the firm. 
  
Sales Growth Defined as the difference between this period sales and previous period sales divided by previous period sales of a business unit. 
  
EBIT Defined as earnings before interest payments and taxes of a business unit. 
  
Total Assets Defined as the sum of the book values of a business unit's fixed and current assets. 
  
Cash Flow from Operations Defined as net income +/- depreciation and amortization +/- changes in working capital of a business unit. 
  
Personnel Defined as the number of employees being employed in a business unit. 
  
Managerial power variables   
Tenure at Firm Number of years a Division CEO has been working in the firm. 
  
Tenure as Division CEO Number of months a Division CEO has been working in his position as Division CEO. 
  
Engineering Degree Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a Division CEO has an engineering degree. 
  
Local Nationality Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a Division CEO has the nationality of the country where the firm originates from and has its main operations 
  
Cash windfall variables   
Cash Windfall  Cash inflow at the headquarter level that results from the selling of equity stakes in other firms (in million EUR) 
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Appendix A-3: Detailed Description of Cash Windfalls 
 
This table presents a detailed description of the cash windfalls. It contains information on the date on which the stake was sold, the main country in which the company operated, where 
the sold company was traded, the corporate performance (before the sale) of the company in which the stake was sold, the equity stake our sample firm had before and after the sale (in 
%), the cash inflow resulting from the sale, the reported profit on the sale, reported information on whether or not the profit of the sale was taxable, the procedure of the sale (SEO 
meaning seasoned equity offering, IPO meaning initial public offering, and OTC meaning sale over-the-counter). The table further reports how the company obtained the stake, the 
holding period of the stake, the stated reasons on why the stake was sold, and the stated reasons on what the sample firm did with the proceedings. This table is based on information 
from company news reports as well as newspaper articles. 
 
Equity 
Stake 
Date 
of 
Sale 
Main 
Country of 
Operation 
Company 
Publicly 
Traded? 
Performance 
of Company 
before Sale 
Pre-
Sale 
Equity 
Stake 
(in %) 
Post-Sale 
Equity 
Stake (in 
%) 
How did 
Company get 
Equity Stake? 
Cash 
Inflow 
(in 
million 
EUR) 
Profit 
on Sale 
(in 
million 
EUR) 
Profit 
Taxable? 
Procedure 
of Sale 
Holding 
Period 
(in 
years) 
Stated 
Reason 
for Sale  
Stated Use 
of Money  
Equity 
Stake 1 
Q4 
2003 
Taiwan Yes (Taiwan 
Stock 
Exchange and 
NYSE) 
Good 
performance 
25.1 19.1 Firm initially set-
up as joint 
venture 
935 695 Yes SEO 16 Non-
strategic 
asset; 
Exploit 
high 
market 
value 
General 
corporate 
purposes, 
Reduction 
of debt 
Equity 
Stake 2 
Q3 
2004 
US   Yes (NYSE) Normal 
performance 
83.5 37.7 Results from 
venture capital 
investment 
672 635 Yes IPO 19 Non-
strategic 
asset 
General 
corporate 
purposes 
Equity 
Stake 3 
Q4 
2004 
Worldwide Yes 
(EURONEXT 
Paris and 
NYSE) 
Bad 
performance 
3 0 Results from 
carve-out of 
former Business 
Unit 
720 300 No OTC 6 Non-
strategic 
asset; 
Exploit 
high 
market 
value 
Fund 
strategic 
growth 
options 
Equity 
Stake 4 
Q4 
2004 
Europe   Yes 
(EURONEXT 
Paris) 
Normal 
performance 
31.9 15.4 Results from 
carve-out of 
former Business 
Unit 
550 160 No OTC 4 Reduce 
exposure 
to cyclical 
industry; 
Non-
strategic 
asset 
Fund 
strategic 
growth 
options 
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Appendix A-3: Detailed Description of Cash Windfalls (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Equity 
Stake 
Date 
of 
Sale 
Main 
Country of 
Operation 
Company 
Publicly 
Traded? 
Performance 
of Company 
before Sale 
Pre-
Sale 
Equity 
Stake 
(in %) 
Post-Sale 
Equity 
Stake (in 
%) 
How did 
Company get 
Equity Stake? 
Cash 
Inflow 
(in 
million 
EUR) 
Profit 
on Sale 
(in 
million 
EUR) 
Profit 
Taxable? 
Procedure 
of Sale 
Holding 
Period 
(in 
years) 
Stated 
Reason for 
Sale  
Stated Use 
of Money  
Equity 
Stake  
5 
Q2 
2005 
US   Yes (NYSE) Normal 
performance 
37.1 3.5 Results from 
venture capital 
investment 
870 753 Yes SEO 20 Exploit 
high 
market 
value 
Fund 
strategic 
growth 
options 
Equity 
Stake  
6 
Q3 
2005 
Europe   Yes 
(EURONEXT 
Paris) 
Normal 
performance 
15.4 0 Results from 
carve-out of 
former Business 
Unit 
550 185 No OTC 5 Non-
strategic 
asset 
Fund 
strategic 
growth 
options 
Equity 
Stake  
7 
Q3 
2005 
Taiwan Yes (Taiwan 
Stock 
Exchange and 
NYSE) 
Normal 
performance 
19 16.4 Firm initially set-
up as joint 
venture 
715 460 Yes SEO 18 Non-
strategic 
asset 
n/a 
Equity 
Stake  
8 
Q4 
2005 
Korea Yes (Korea 
Stock 
Exchange and 
NYSE) 
Good 
performance 
40.5 32.9 Firm initially set-
up as joint 
venture 
615 211 No  SEO 6 Reduce 
exposure 
to cyclical 
industry 
Fund 
strategic 
growth 
options 
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